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Jains and Sophists on Syadvada

By Ms. Isha Gamlath, Sri Lanka


Diverse philosophical systems both in ancient Greece and India have attempted to provide a solution for the problem of the reality of the universe. The pre-Socratic philosophers have offered a single underlying substance from which the universe was created. It was either material or abstract. Advaita Vedantism and Buddhism are comparable to this strain where the former depended on the one unchanging concept, Brahman or the Supreme Being while the latter on the constantly changing from of sanskara or formation. The last in the line of the pre-Socratics, the Sophists were innovative in their contribution to construct a system of knowledge. In keeping with this Sophistic trend is Jainism. The Jain theory of Syadvada rests on the fact that no one universal knowledge is possible. Nothing is absolute and there is no definite position or negation. This paper examines the Jain theory of Syadvada reflected in Sophistic philosophy.

 

One sidedness in an argument or Ekanthavada is rejected by both the Sophists and the Jains. The Jains have identified Anekanthavada or relative pluralism with Syadvada or the view that knowledge depends on individual perception. It is recorded that the Sophists were active in Athens by the late 5th century in B.C. and the early, 4th century B.C. The word 'Sophistes' meant skilled craftsman or wise men but later on it was regarded as professional teacher who taught wisdom for money. The outstanding Sophists of ancient Greece, Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, Antiphon and Critias have demonstrated that no prior knowledge of philosophy was required to understand what they taught. Knowledge cannot be one but many. It was inkeeping with Syadvada. The following lines of Protagoras throw light on the Jain theory of Syadvada: Of all things the measure is Man of the things that are that they are, and of the things that are, not, that they are not.'

On a similar footing the Jains, headed by the greatest thirthamkara, Wardhamana Mahavira, maintained that absolute affirmation and absolute negation are both wrong. This same idea is accepted in the Mundaka Upanishad (II, I, 1), Svetasvatara Upanishad (iv.'18) and Samyuktha Nikaya (Oldenberg.p.249). Accordingly. neither being nor non-Being is the absolute reality. It cannot be an Ekanthavada for reality is both subjective. All knowledge of reality depends on the individual. 'Man' is the 'measure' for the knowledge of reality, according to the Sophists. It was protagoras' idea 'to make the weaker cause stronger' (Fr.6b). This became commonly accepted by all other Sophists.

The sevenfold steps or the Jain Sapthabhangi correspond with the arguments of Gorgias of Leontini. The Sapthabhangi consists of :

1. May be is - syat asti
2. May be is not - syat nasti
3. May be is and is not - syat asti nasti
4. May be is inexpressible - syat avaktavyah
5. May is and is inexpressible - syat asti ca avaktavyah
6. May be is not and is inexpressible - syat nasti ca avaktavyh
7. May be is not and is inexpressible -syat asti ca nasti ca avaktavyah

Corresponding to these Sopthabhangi Gorgias said :
1. Nothing exists 
a. Not being does not exist
b. Being does not exist

I. As everlasting
II. As created
III. As both
IV. As One
V. As Many 

c. A mixture of Being and not - Being does not exist 

2. If anything exists it is incomprehensible. 

3. If it is comprehensible it is incommunicable. 

(Sextus from On Being or On nature in Fr.3.)

Both the Jains and the Sophists agree that there cannot be an Ekanthavada theory. Only Anekanthavada or Syadvada exists in all arguments. The earliest mention of Syadvada and Sapthabhangi comes in Bhadrabahu's commentary Sutrakrtanganiryukthi. Since there is no nyaya whatever and since knowledge corresponds to Syadvada there can be no universal vada or nyaya.

The realization of this alone that knowledge is individual is the proper application of the theory of nyaya. When Syadvada does not depend on this realization it is nyabhasa. There can be no byabhasa when philosophy undertakes to analyse the nature of knowledge, samyagjnana or pramana. Knowledge associates Syadvada. A line of similar nature comes in Lycophron the: Sophist: 'knowledge is an association between the act of knowing and the soul; (fr.1). Similarly the Jains maintained that knowledge can be known and at the same time be unknown. The validity of knowledge depends on its condition. Reality could be understood according to two principles, say the Jains. They are vidhi or affirmation and nisedha or negation. But they teach that neither vidhi nor nisedha are absolute; permanent; The only two objective facts associating reality are existence and non-existence. Existence and non- existence are related to each other by avinabhava or inseparable relation. Reality considered in the light of its own nature is existent or svarupena while considered in its other nature, or apararupata, is non- existent or pararupena. The four conditions, vidhi, nisedha, svarupena and pararupena consist of further conditions. They are dravya or substance, desa or space, kala or time, and bhava or state of the 'real; A particular reality like X could be existent in one condition but non-existent in another. Similarly the Sophists maintained that what appears right to X may not be so to Y and Z could either agree with X or Y or with X and Y or perhaps introduce a whole new theory. There could be no vada or nyaya that can be universally true. About the nature of the gods the views of Protagoras are inkeeping with that of Syadvada.
They are:

'About the gods I am not able to know whether they exist or do not exist, nor in form; for the factors preventing knowledge are many: the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life; Diogenes Laertius (9.24) holds that Melissus said that it wan wrong to make pronouncement of gods, because knowledge of them is impossible. Plato in Theatetus (162 b) says that Protagoras is objecting to the introduction of gods in to the discussions ' whose existence or non-existence he expressly refuses to discuss in his speeches and writings.' The views of Prodicus of Cos, Critias of Tegea and Thedorus of Cyrene. Without adequate facts, then, Protagoras avoided offering explanations. It is his desire 'to make the weaker cause the stronger' (Fr 6b). For this he requires facts but the knowledge that a Sophist bases on facts cannot be universally true. Hence it is inkeeping with the Jain Syadvada.

The Jain theories, vidhi and nisedha correspond to Being and Non-Being of Gorgias His Fr.3 derived from Sextus from 'On Being' or 'On Nature' depicts that neither Being nor non-Being exist. If Being exists it should be everlasting created and have a beginning. But it is not so. 'It cannot be contained by itself for then the thing containing and the thing contained would be the same and being would become two things- both position and body-which is absurd: Being and non-Being cannot exist at the same time. If Being does not exist then nothing exists even if anything exists that cannot be comprehended or communicated. Portagoras writers :

'Therefore reality is not the object of thought and cannot be comprehended by it. Pure mind as opposed to sense-perception or even as and equally valid criterion is a myth". The Jains hod that all things are Anekantha. All affirmations are true. Being or sat is neither absolutely unchangeable nor momentarily changeable. It involves the acquisition of new qualities or utpada and the loss of old qualities (tattvarthadhigamasutta). For e.g. a dravya or substance is made of atoms and not akasa or empty space. A substance is a dravya only in the sense that it is made of atoms and not of space. Then it is both dravya and not dravya at the same time. Dravya possess and infinite number of qualities, ananthadarshana tamaham vastu. Each of the qualities can only be affirmed in a particular sense. For e.g. a jug could have an infinite number of qualities and they can be grasped from infinite points of view. It could be made of clay, steel or glass, it could be the colour of brown, white, green or red, it could be big or small, it would be short or tall, etc. All these views could be true. They can all be true in certain instances and not always and absolutely.

(Tattvarthaedhigama Sutta and Gunaratna in Saddhars anasmuccya. P211 in Dasgupta p.176).

This brings the sophists closer to the Jains. Diogense Laertius (ix.51) records :

'Protagoras was the first to maintain that in every experience there are two logoi in, opposition to each other :

Dopgenes in implying the dissoi logoi or the double argument which was popular among the Sophists. An implication of the double argument already maintained by Heracleitas in Fr. 49 a.-'in the same rover we both step and do not step, we are and we are not: He also maintains that one concept can be of vice and virtue, 'War is both king of all and father of all, and it has revealed some as gods, others as men; some it has made slaves, others free; Of the Sophist dissoi logoi Aristotle in Metaphysics, 1005a-10011b explains that if all contradictory statements about the same thing were true all things would be one and indistinguishable. In Metaphysics B5 A1 be mentions that the one and the indistinguishable exists in the realization that thought and knowledge depend not with sense perception but with their underlying essence. This is the fundamental reality. The fundamental reality would be based on only one out of two contradictory statements. Another argument against Protagoras dissoi Logi was the ' recoil' used by Democritus and Plato. According to recoil if every opinion based on sense (or syadvada) is true then the view that every opinion is not true cab be realized by others. In order to reject this accusation Protagoras presented man or the individual in the light of master of opinions. Hence he is the measure of all things (Fr.1) his opinion is his Syadvada. Socrates in Theaetetus (116A-168C) talks with Theaetetus in the words of Protagoras about the food eaten by the sick appearing bitter and by the healthy appearing the opposite :

'One must not represent either the one or the other of the two men as wise-nor in fact would that be possible, nor must one bring about a change that the sick man is ignorant because he holds a valueless opinion and that the healthy man is on the contrary wise because this second state is better :

From this comes the antithesis of Protagoras :

'The logoi in opposition to each other.' In order to avoid the rejection of the two opposites Protagoras brought forth the fact that all knowledge depended on the individual-'man is the measure of all things.' The Jain theory of Syuadvada, then applies perfectly to the system of the Sophists were the fragments of Gorgias in his 'Enconium on Helen'. The following fragments present Helen in the light of the necessity to highlight her not as one who did wrong, 'It belongs to the same man both to speak the truth and to refute falsehood. Helen is universally condemned and regarded as the symbol of disasters: I wish to subject her story to critical examination and so rescue her from ignorant calumny.' Gorgias continues to describe four major reasons that may have persuaded. Helen to leave Menelaus and elope with Paris and cause devastation at the Trojan War. They are fate and divine will, force of Paris, his speech and his beauty and 'therefore whichever of the four reasons caused Helen's action, she is innocent' (Fr. 11.20) While describing these four reasons Gorgias succeeds in presenting the many sidedness of as argument which resembles the Anekanthavada theory of the Jains. The following fragment on poetry portrays the effects of it on the hearers which once again highlights the Anekanthavada theory:

'All poetry can be called speech in metre. Its hearers shudder with terror, shed tears of pity, and yearn with sad longing, the soul, affected by the words, feels as its own an emotion arouse by the good and ill fortunes of other people's actions and lives'. While inkeeping with Anekanthavada these arguments also associate the Sophist trend to make the 'weaker cause strong.'

The Jains maintain that every idea is perceptional or pratyaksa and non-perceptive or paroksa (Jaina-tarka-varttika of siddhasena, chap I and Vrtti by Santyacarya, Pramananyattvalokalamkara ch. I Priksa-mukhasuttra-vrtti, ch. I in Dasgupta p. 183)

Paroksa reveals itself by the association of the sense. The five cognitive sense compare with the five kinds of sense knowledge. Paroksa does not present a clear picture of objects as does pratyaksa. Pratyaka included both the sense organs and the soul. Pratyaksa ensures that knowledge is correct. Knowledge is an expression of one's own self. In other words knowledge is individual and corresponds with Syadvada. Syadvada applies to the Sophistic argument as well which highlight that there can be no Ekanthavada but only Anekanthavada. An infinite number of affirmations are made possible through an infinite amount of views. This is proved by both the Jains and the Sophists.

 

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Author : Ms. Isha Gamlath, Senior Lecturer, Dept. of Western Classics, University of Kelaniya, Kelaniya
Sri Lanka, E-Mail : isha@kln.ac.lk

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Mail to : Ahimsa Foundation
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